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Clinical Insights about Mental Difference
John Seem
Viterbo College
ABSTRACT
Self-actualization is sought by all people. Experience with mental difference, both as
a patient and as a staff member in a mental hospital leads to a greater understanding
of the meaning and nature of this difference. It arises from variations in biographical
experience, social interactions, personal frame and self-choice. Providing the mentally
different with the responsibility of at least limited choice empowers them while
affirming their human dignity and worth.
During the years 1975–1978, I lived through what I consider to be a unique
experience. I became emotionally and mentally different from normal persons—
first as an outpatient and later as an inpatient in a state mental hospital. This
first episode was immediately followed by employment in a state institution for
the chronically mentally ill/mentally retarded, initially as an orderly, then as an
administrator and counselor. Thus, I experienced mental difference from "both
sides"—as patient1 and clinician. As a Ph.D. candidate in sociology at that time,
I was able to reflect sociologically on events even as I experienced them.
I would like to share this experience in order to perhaps convey some in-
sight. Humanistic, existential, and symbolic interaction theoretical perspectives
are used to explicate mental difference as self-negation or affirmation of personal
meaning, self-labeling, institutionalization, treatment as violence, alienation, in-
visibility, journey into self, restrained choice of self, and self-actualization.
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The Experience
Outpatient
In 1975, I was studying to become a mathematical sociologist and was about
to take my last comprehensive examination. I became alienated from my wife,
and we separated. On the day that we moved her belongings from our home,
I experienced a deep sense of loss. I moved to a different apartment where I
chose to live alone. I became very angry at sociology, blaming it for the end
of my marriage. I resigned my fellowship, withdrew from graduate school, and
began employment as a health planner for a state health planning agency.
I had always liked music, so I became very involved with it. I spent about
$150 every two weeks on albums and would often spend evenings after work
listening intently to music. Even though my stereo was modest, the music would
literally leap from the album into me; I felt at one with a song.
I was filled with energy during this time. My work as a health planner was
challenging and merited praise. I dated a woman, felt that I desperately needed
to fall in love, and was crushed when she ended our relationship. I lost my
ability to sleep for more than four consecutive hours.
After about six months, I became disillusioned with health planning, the
stated goals of which were to promote equal and accessible health services for
all persons while maximizing citizen input in the planning process. My analysis
of organizational policy and behavior indicated that the latent, but dominant,
purpose of health planning was to legitimize physician and hospital control of
health services.
After a long, sleepless night, I called the director of the agency and informed
him of my conclusion about the agency. He suggested that I consider resignation.
After one day, I decided to seek counseling and return to my job. A psy-
chiatrist prescribed medication. During the next week, while sitting at home, I
heard and felt a spirit enter my apartment. I was first terrified but later sensed
that it meant no harm. The psychiatrist prescribed a new medication.
During the next week, again while sitting at home after work, I experienced
a "thud" deep inside me. My emotions and energy fell out on the floor. I cried
hysterically and felt hopelessly abandoned.
I called my work supervisor the next morning, informed him of my condi-
tion, and resigned. Counseling continued. After about eight weeks of unemploy-
ment, I regained some inner strength and moved into a new apartment with a
roommate. I still felt terribly alone, but at least I was functioning more normally.
I reapplied to graduate school and was awarded an assistantship. I continued to
see the same psychiatrist and began to get ready for fall semester.
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I then encountered deep images of my father leaving my family when I
was fifteen years old. He, too, had become mentally different. The pain of my
impending divorce was multiplied by the sense of loss of my father during
adolescence.
I lost my ability to read. I was supposed to teach a Marriage and Family
course that fall, but I could not read the text. If I could not read, I could not
return to graduate school. I was seeing the psychiatrist several times a week.
She verbalized concern for me but seemed to keep me at a distance. I felt that I
was crying out for help but that none was forthcoming. There seemed to be no
way out.
I had thought about killing myself before by jumping in front of a moving
car, but it was just fantasy. I knew I could never shoot myself, but I developed
a different plan: I would swallow a whole bottle of prescribed drugs, pass out,
and die peacefully.
On the day of my self-execution, I visited the sociology department. Death
was imminent; no need to worry. As I left the sociology building I encountered
a friend. He asked me how I was doing. My lips answered "fine," but I felt
completely detached from him.
I returned to my apartment, swallowed the pills, and lay on the bed, waiting
to die. As the world became fuzzy, I staggered from my bedroom to the living
room, where I informed my roommate of my action. He rushed me to the
hospital. I awoke to a new day.
The psychiatrist arrived and apologized for not seeing the immediacy of my
deterioration. I was released to my mother's care and returned to her home and
began outpatient counseling. One day I heard God say to me, "I will always be
with you, John." I became increasingly reclusive and, realizing my condition,
asked to be taken to a state mental institution. I was admitted with a diagnosis
of "schizophrenic break." I would remain hospitalized for five weeks.
Inpatient
After being admitted to the hospital, I felt relieved. Here I could be myself.
I no longer had to try to pretend that I was "normal." I went to my room, put
on my hospital gown, and lay on the bed. Surely these people could help me!
I soon encountered a sense of separateness from most of the patients. Even
when we played pool together, we rarely talked. In one room where we gathered
to smoke, many of the patients acted very weird. Some related long histories of
hospitalization. I wondered if I would recover or become like them. The days
drifted by in an aimless fashion.
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I began to work two hours a day doing dishes. This was terrific! I was
amazed and rather proud that I could actually complete dishwashing tasks. Or-
derlies joked with me and assured me that I would get better.
Every weekday we had "group" on my unit. The social worker would sit
with us for one hour, asking us to discuss personal problems. Each patient
seemed quite different from the rest. Brief conversations between individual
patients and the social worker seemed disconnected from one another. My im-
pression was that "group" was useless.
I met with the social worker for one hour twice a week. I constantly sought
answers to two questions: "What is wrong with me?" and "What can you do to
make me better?" I learned that I was depressed. I learned, not by instruction
but by insight, that there was nothing that the social worker or the state hospital
could do to help me. / had to do it myself. With the social worker's assistance, I
formulated a plan. I would buy a car, move back to the city where my graduate
program was located, continue counseling, stay with a friend, find a job, get my
own apartment, and eventually go back and finish graduate school. A bold plan!
I took a large risk and did it.
Technician
After moving, I applied for an orderly position at a state institution for the
mentally ill and mentally retarded. As part of the job interview, I was given
a tour of the living unit on which I would work. Patients were walking about
singing, shouting, uttering redundant phrases, shaking their head or their arms,
calling for help, and stealing from others.
I was hired as an orderly and got to know the patients. Each one had a "dif-
ferent" side—redundant mannerisms, shouting, clinging, stealing, an inability to
talk, or violence against self or others. However, each patient also had a very
human, loving side, which manifested itself as trust, a gesture of kindness, a
joking manner, or expressions of liking or thanks. I found that showing kindness
to these people healed my own brokenness.
One night I volunteered to escort a female patient to a movie in the recre-
ation center. She reached for my hand during the movie, and we held hands
until the movie was finished. This experience, and others like it, allowed me
to realize that we, as people, are all one, and that only acts of fate separate us
from one another.
The frequency of deviant behavior by patients varied inversely with their
distance from the living unit. The patients' shared norms legitimated "acting
out" on the living unit. Vocational training and eating occurred off the living
unit but in the same building. Here a different set of norms operated. Some
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"acting out" would inevitably occur, but patients would instruct each other to
act appropriately. When the patients left the building to go on field trips, "act-
ing out" was extremely rare. Patients sincerely tried to "fit in" and "act like
normal people."
When a patient became physically violent (hit self or others), a buildingwide
emergency would be called over the intercom. Orderlies would race to the place
of violence and subdue the patient. We would place the patient in leather wrist
and ankle restraints and carry him or her to a time-out room, where a nurse would
administer a tranquilizer. I came to see this procedure as violence committed
against the patient.
I soon noticed that many patients carried psychiatric diagnoses of "or-
ganic brain syndrome" and/or "schizophrenia," which the psychiatrist assured
me caused them to behave violently and bizarrely. I realized that diagnoses of
"organic brain syndrome" and "schizophrenia" were tautologies: patients who
act differently have organic brain syndrome and/or schizophrenia; patients with
organic brain syndrome and/or schizophrenia act differently.
I began to see the starkness of the institution—white walls, gray metal doors,
and near-empty dressers—and the great dependency of the patients. Both the
physical and social contexts functioned to institutionalize patients and convey to
them a childlike, dependent, and irresponsible self-concept. ("Don't be a naughty
boy or we'll take away your cigarettes.")
Psychological Services Assistant
I was promoted to Psychological Services Assistant and served as assistant
administrator and counselor to thirty patients of one living unit. My supervisor
was a psychologist.
My major job responsibility was to write comprehensive behavior modifi-
cation programs for all patients. Many of these programs included consequences
for multiple types of deviant behavior. The programs were known by all employ-
ees in the building so that patients could not escape the consequences of deviant
acts. Patients were first verbally cued to stop a deviant behavior. If the deviant
behavior continued, they were sequentially denied a reward (e.g., cigarettes),
sent to their room, placed in the time-out room, placed in restraints and, finally,
given a tranquilizer. If the patients behaved appropriately for a certain period
of time, they were given a reward (verbal praise, candy or cigarettes, or a trip
to the canteen). My most striking observation about these elaborate behavior
modification programs was the patients' great abilities to resist programming
and to continue their deviant acts. Through programming, hospital staff were
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supposed to control patients' behaviors. In reality, however, behavior program-
ming allowed patients to manipulate the behavior of staff. When a patient "acted
out," I wrote a new program. When she again "acted out," I again wrote a new
program. Staff continued to modify their responses while the patient continued
to display similar deviant behavior.
One day, I tried a new intervention with a patient. Instead of placing him
in restraints, I entered his room alone and talked to him for half an hour. Every
time he would begin screaming and slapping his face, I would tell him to relax
and assure him that he would be all right. The patient looked at me with both
fear and amazement, perhaps wondering when I was going to call other orderlies
and place him in restraints. After half an hour, he did calm down and was able
to leave his room.
When the supervising psychologist learned of my intervention, he criticized
me. I informed him that I had frequently observed that restraints produced,
rather than reduced, further violence. He discredited my observation and told
me never to repeat the new intervention. He explained that we simply did not
have the time to use verbal assurance with all the patients. Leather restraints
and tranquilizers were more efficient.
The general consensus among hospital employees was that our purpose was
to modify the behaviors of patients so that they could move to less restrictive
placements (group homes or apartments). However, in the year and a half that I
worked at the institution, no patients from my living unit were placed. Almost
all patients continued to perform the same deviant behaviors, and two people
became more violent when their placement neared. I became convinced that the
real, but unstated, purpose of the institution was to manage patients' deviant
behavior, while keeping the patients out of public view in a secluded area near
city limits.
One day a nineteen-year-old patient wandered into my office. He was unable
to talk but communicated to me by urinating in my wastebasket. In the past,
he had often wandered by my office while attempting to escape vocational
rehabilitation class. I had then gently pushed him down the hallway and back
to class. As he urinated in my wastebasket, his smile suggested that he was
"repaying" me. This symbolized for me both the control that I exercised over
patients and the personal abuse that I received in return. I decided to return to
graduate school.
I took another risk in 1978 when I resigned my institutional position and
returned to graduate school. I originally had left graduate school as a cynical
positivist and grand theorist. I now returned as a person most interested in
humanism, existentialism, and sociological practice.
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Theory Explication
The approach toward theory construction taken in this paper is grounded in
personal experience. Theoretical concepts and propositions that sociologically
organize my experience will be explicated from my story.
The traditional dichotomy between objective, empirical data and subjective,
experiential information is misleading. All perceptions of data and information
are filtered through the person doing the experiencing and are, therefore, subjec-
tive in nature (King, Valle, & Citrenbaum, 1978). Knowledge must be valid if
it is to be scientific. To the degree that concepts and propositions are consistent
with people's subjective experience, and to the degree that these concepts and
propositions give order and meaning to subjective experience, the validities of
these concepts and propositions are supported. These validities remain tentative,
subject to new experience and new conceptual ordering. The validities of con-
cepts and propositions introduced in this section are supported to the degree that
they give order and meaning to the preceding experiential narrative.
This section will focus on the mutual influence of self and social context
in ongoing interaction. The individual is constrained by social context while
retaining some freedom to exercise choice (O'Brien & Sterne, 1986). The self
is a real essence, not a conceptual reification. Each of us experiences a sense of
self as an organizing principle in life. The self experiences feelings, learns new
information, raises questions, organizes information in meaningful ways, makes
decisions, and initiates action. A sense of self gives life continuity (Kotarba &
Fontana, 1984).
The Actualization Tendency
Human beings possess a tendency toward self-actualization, or becoming,
but never fully realizing, the best that they can be. Humans react to a call to self-
actualization from within themselves (Tageson, 1982). Genetic, biological, or
sociocultural variables may encourage, shape, or constrain—but not completely
suppress —this self-actualization tendency.
The mentally ill and mentally retarded patients that I came to know clearly
demonstrated the actualization tendency. These people were severely hampered
by genetic and biological factors, including low "intelligence" (moderately to
severely retarded), seizures, short attention spans, and manic mood swings. The
self-actualization of patients also was hampered by a social context that re-
stricted interaction with persons and groups outside of the institution while
encouraging compliant behavior and dependent, childlike views of self. Despite
these obstacles, patients did move toward self-actualization. People who were
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unable to talk developed their capacities to smile, wink, touch, or play jokes on
staff, like flushing their diaper down the toilet. People who could talk would
use laughter and speech to convey a sense of joy or encouragement to others.
People who possessed a fair amount of inner strength would resist dependency
on rewards from others, encouraged by behavior programming, and affirm their
own individuality.
Abraham Maslow (1962) presents a hierarchical theory of self-actualization.
Social contextual preconditions to self-actualization include freedom, justice, or-
derliness, and stimulation. The person first focuses on satisfaction of physiolog-
ical needs. Once these physiological needs are at least partially met, the primary
focus may be shifted to the satisfaction of basic needs, including safety and se-
curity, love and belongingness, and self-esteem and esteem by others. Once the
person experiences at least partial satisfaction of both physiological and basic
needs, some attention may be directed toward the fulfillment of growth needs.
Degree of personal self-actualization becomes great when the person is able to
reach significant, but never complete, satisfaction of growth needs.
My own experience supports the validity of Maslow's theory. When I sep-
arated from my wife and left the graduate program, I lost a sense of love and
belongingness. As my life became increasingly more chaotic, I lost my sense of
safety and security. So much of my attention was devoted to once again fulfill-
ing these needs (new relationships, new career, new living arrangements) that I
was unable to maintain my sense of esteem. By the time I became an inpatient,
I believed myself to be incompetent and dependent. It was only when I was
once again employed and able to construct a "normal lifestyle" (car, apartment,
friends, fun) that I realized a renewed sense of safety and security, love and
belongingness, and self-esteem.
Most of the mentally different patients with whom I worked were focused
on the satisfaction of physiological, safety and security, and love and belong-
ingness needs. Their lives were characterized by much chaos and little intimacy.
Some patients would hide in their rooms in search of security. Others would
act outrageously or steal items for the personal attention that these acts would
bring. Physical abuse against self or others encouraged orderlies to respond with
physical intimacy (touching, subduing, and/or wrestling). This physical intimacy
from staff provided a certain sense of belongingness for patients.
The Will to Meaning
One of Maslow's growth needs, the need for existential meaning or pur-
pose, is further articulated by Viktor Frankl (1984). Frankl transforms Maslow's
affective need for meaning into a cognitive will toward meaning. He asserts that
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we, as humans, are free to exercise this will, to adopt an attitude toward a situa-
tion, to realize meaning in our existence. He supports his assertion by describing
his own will to meaning while imprisoned in a Nazi concentration camp.
My own experience during a time of mental difference validates Frankl's
articulation of a will to meaning. In the midst of continuing personal pain,
I would remind myself that if I could live and pass through this pain I would
realize much self-growth and personal insight. I could then share this insight with
others. I would imagine myself as a college professor, giving important lectures
and writing insightful articles derived from my experience. This attitude toward
my suffering introjected meaning into it. When I perceived myself as unable to
return to graduate school, and therefore unable to become a college professor
and share my insights, I chose to define my suffering as meaningless, and hence
attempted suicide. Although past experiences and present circumstances had
encouraged me to develop a very narrow focus, I could have made a different
choice. I remained free to realize meaning in further suffering.
Self-Labeling
Labeling theory often attributes the initial labeling act to someone other
than the person who behaves in a deviant way. This other person invokes a
stereotype to interpret the deviant act and then labels the individual as deviant.
Over time the individual comes to accept the deviant label assigned by others
(Scheff, 1963; Pfuhl, 1986).
My own experience with mental difference prior to hospitalization is not
consistent with the preceding scenario. I did not experience that my supervisor,
friends, family, or the psychiatrist labeled me as mentally ill. The psychiatrist
carefully avoided assigning a label to my condition. Certainly my presence in
the psychiatrist's office and the prescription of medication tended to validate
the possibility of mental illness. But it was my own self, through the process of
retrospective interpretation, that assigned a label to my mental difference (Pfuhl,
1986): "I can't sleep. Not being able to sleep is a sign of depression. I must be
depressed"; or, later "It's abnormal to realize this much meaning from music,
sense that a spirit lives in my home, and feel my emotions fall out on the floor.
These experiences could be signs of schizophrenia. My father is schizophrenic.
I must be schizophrenic."
The first significant labeling by others occurred when I entered the state
hospital. I was labeled the victim of a "schizophrenic break." I was actually
relieved to receive this label, because I had been labeling myself as schizophrenic
for some time and now learned that schizophrenic breaks were often temporary.
Given my age, it was quite possible that I would recover.
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Institutionalization
Institutionalization is a social psychological process by which a mental
patient and the institutional context interact to produce an increasing sense of
dependency in the patient and the patient's belief that he or she cannot function
outside the institution (Goffman, 1961). The consequences of institutionalization
include depersonalization, segregation, self-mortification, self-labeling, and a
sense of powerlessness. Institutional staff interpret the patient's behavior in terms
of the label, and it becomes very difficult for the patient to escape from that
label (Rosenhan, 1973).
As an inpatient, I experienced an introduction to institutionalization. When
I was admitted to the state institution, my self-confidence was already very low.
There was a certain comfort in the institutional routine. Not much was required
of me. I could be quite passive. The presence of very long-term cases on my
living unit forced me to think about the possibility that I, too, might not leave.
We were very segregated from the outer world. No trips into the community
were scheduled. I soon realized that the therapy was not really that therapeutic.
I was terrified about returning to the outer world but also terrified about staying
in the institution. When I tried to normalize my life by having a slight sexual
relationship with a female patient, I was disciplined by hospital staff.
I remember wondering if I would remain within the institution for the rest
of my life. There was a gentle whirlpool there that could suck you in: "Just go to
group, go to therapy, do the dishes, and hang out. You'll never have to go back
to that scary world again." I was fortunate in that I had an inner source of hope
and good coping skills. I made a personal choice to leave the seductive privacy
of the hospital; I formulated a plan and left the confines of the institution.
As a clinician, I observed both the process and human products of insti-
tutionalization. All patients were labeled with diagnoses, usually organic brain
syndrome and/or schizophrenia. These diagnoses were master statuses. All pa-
tient behaviors were interpreted in terms of diagnoses. Even as staff implemented
behavior programs upon their patients, these same staff expected patients to dis-
play deviant behavior. Patients were viewed as naughty children.
Treatment as Violence
Behavior programming, regarded as treatment within the institution, did
violence to the selves of both patient and staff. As the severity of discipline
increased, it was experienced by the patient as a threat to his safety and security
and as violence against self. The patient fought violence with aggression toward
staff. As staff continued to experience this escalating discipline and aggression
pattern, it became difficult for them to rationalize the "treatment" as helpful to
CLINICAL INSIGHTS ABOUT MENTAL DIFFERENCE 153
the patient. Staff confronted their own aggression and their self-esteem declined.
Hospital policy prescribed that the discipline procedure continue.
Alienation
When I was mentally different, I experienced a great sense of alienation.
This sense included feelings of loneliness, normlessness, meaninglessness, and
isolation from self and others (Schact, 1984). I experienced self as an object that
I could reflect on ("Am I crazy?") but not truly feel an identity with ("Is this
really me?"). I experienced self not as a loving, creative person but as an object
devoid of depth of feeling and adrift on an ocean of fate, without initiative or
impact. Other persons were as objects in my perceptual field. I was unable to
feel relationship with them or grasp their human essence.
Invisibility
As a patient, my sense of alienation from the psychiatrist and the social
worker probably had some basis in fact. I sensed that these persons related
to me as a case to be processed in certain ways prescribed by their favorite
psychotherapeutic approach. To the psychiatrist, I was a case to be processed in
a nondirective way. To the hospital social worker, I was a case to be processed
in a very rational way. In both instances, I was a case—an object. My own
reality and the uniqueness of my experience were not validated by them. I felt
unseen and invisible to them.
The common explanation of a patient's outbursts among hospital staff
was "attention-getting behavior." This explanation holds insight. Biting, hitting,
shouting, stealing, and/or throwing objects are ways for patients to proclaim
their own uniqueness, to fight against the invisibility that accompanies the pa-
tient label (Ellison, 1972).
Journey into Self
Laing (1967) describes the schizophrenic experience as inner journey. I be-
lieve Laing's observation may be expanded to include much experience labeled
mental illness (including depression and various psychoses) and at least some
experience labeled mental retardation.
The self most typically seeks information and stimulation outside the person,
much of which involves interaction with others. However, sometimes the self
will experience unbearable pain in the outer world and turn inward. Thus begins
the inner journey.
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Most people know little about the inner self because they focus their at-
tention outside. Therefore, when the self turns inward, and the inner journey
begins, the experience is one of isolation, loneliness, confusion, and fear.
Much of my own experience of mental difference is the journey into self:
lack of meaning in school, alienation from self and others, a sense of aban-
donment, intense identification with music, my emotions lying on the floor,
deep images of my father, a feeling of shame, a fear of duplicating my father's
biography, and the courage to risk were all parts of my inner journey.
The images that I encountered during that inner journey are aspects of my
adolescent experience, when my father became mentally different. These images
remained as part of my self but unknown or barely recognized for years. My
journey into self allowed me to reexperience these images.
Laing (1967) suggests that inner journey is a healing process when the
journey is supported and allowed to continue until completion. Was my inner
journey a healing process for me? Certainly it was. The healing continues as I
further integrate the images of the inner journey into my present sense of self.
For me, mental difference was a journey toward greater self-actualization.
In his argument, Laing places responsibility of chronic mental difference on
treatments, practices, or events that prevent the patient from departing from the
inner journey. However, I also believe that the self has the capacity to choose
to remain in the inner journey or to return to an outer focus. I have experienced
such a choice in my own life. Some people choose to remain mentally different;
because for them the inner world—though often confusing—is less threatening
than the outer world as they perceive it.
Mental Difference, Restrained Self-choice, and Actualization
The self exercises limited choice in the process of entering and departing
from mental difference. The self chooses to seek or not to seek actualization,
to experience or not to experience meaning in existence, to label or not to label
self, to accept or to resist institutionalization, to accept or to resist treatment as
violence, to experience or not to experience alienation, to accept or to protest
invisibility, and to enter or to exit from the inner journey.
In a very dynamic fashion, past choices influence intervening experiences,
present social context, and the person's frame. Frame is the self's perception
of possible choices within the present social context. The self chooses in the
present moment based on its frame.
An individual who has experienced the realization of many choices in the
past will have a wide frame and will perceive many possible choices in the
present. A person who has experienced the negation of many choices in the past
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will have a narrow frame and may perceive as few as one or two choices in
the present.
Each individual has a personal theory that rationalizes and justifies her
frame. For instance, one person's theory may be, "I have usually been able to
get what I want in the past. I have many abilities. Even if I make a wrong
choice, I can change my mind." This personal theory rationalizes a wide frame,
including many possible present choices. Another person's theory may be, "Few
of my attempts to accomplish something ever work out. People don't respect
my abilities; neither do I." This personal theory justifies a narrow frame, with
very few possible present choices.
People who choose to become or to remain mentally different have a very
narrow frame and a very restrictive personal theory. For instance, one person's
frame may only include the options of committing suicide or becoming mentally
different. Another person's frame may only include the options of remaining in
a mental hospital or living all alone in a terrifying world.
Within the limitations of personal frame and personal theory, mentally dif-
ferent individuals display the tendency to make self-choices that they believe
will lead to self-actualization. Behavior that appears to be immoral or amoral
to the observer is generally the most moral option within the frame and theory
of the person choosing that behavior. One person's frame and theory may sug-
gest that she may become the best that she can be by choosing inner journey
over external violence. Another person's frame and theory may suggest that he
may become the best that he can be by embracing institutionalization rather
than by trying to act independently, which he believes will inevitably lead to
personal chaos.
Under the postulate of a universal self-actualization tendency, behavior that
appears to be cruel, bizarre, or self-destructive is not an indicator of inadequate
moral character or mental illness but rather indicates the limitations of personal
frame and theory. As clinicians, we should seek to understand the personal frame
and theory of those who are mentally different so that we may also understand
the morality of their choices. We should then help such individuals to expand
their personal frame and theory so that they may strive for self-actualization by
choosing among a wider range of perceived behavioral options.
Conclusions
This paper has interpreted a unique part of my biographical experience
using concepts and propositions of humanism, existentialism, and symbolic in-
teractionism. Mental difference is a social psychological process that includes
self-negation or affirmation of personal meaning, self-labeling, institutionaliza-
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tion, treatment as violence, alienation, invisibility, journey into restrained choice
of self, and self-actualization.
All people seek self-actualization. Badness or personal defect are only labels
applied by persons who express judgment without true understanding. Mental
difference is the outcome of variations in biographical experience, social con-
text, personal frame, personal theory, and self-choice. By first recognizing that
all persons, including the mentally different, exercise restrained choice in de-
termining their own fate, we may then gain a better understanding of how
biographical experience, personal theory, personal frame, and social context in-
fluence a person's choice to embrace or resist mental difference. By affirming
the responsibility of restrained choice among mentally different people, we are
empowering them and affirming their human dignity and worth (O'Brien &
Sterne, 1986).
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NOTES
1. The term "patient" is used throughout this paper. While I prefer the term "person," "patient"
offers greater clarity to the reader.
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